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Abstract
I argue that large youth cohorts consisting of males aged 15–19 increase the risk of civil
conflict, by boosting the pool of potential recruits (PR) along the extensive (cohort size) and
intensive (marginalization) margin. As these large cohorts transit out of the pool of PR in their
mid-40s, the risk of civil conflict declines again. My estimates show that the size of male
cohorts aged 15–19 is strongly positively related to the risk of the onset of civil conflict for
a sample of African countries from 1960 to 2009. A one-percent increase in this population
group increases the likelihood of the onset of civil conflict by 1.4 percentage points. The
results further show that better economic perspectives—in particular, high contemporaneous
rainfall, higher agricultural output and foreign aid—considerably hamper this effect. Also ur-
banization mitigates the impact of youth bulges. This suggests that civil conflict is more likely
when several adverse factors coincide and that economic conditions affect civil conflicts via
a marginalization of youth population. In turn, a one-percent increase in the male population
aged 40–44 reduces the risk of conflict by 0.8 percentage points. To avoid endogeneity and
omitted variable bias, I use rainfall variation in the birth year of the respective age cohorts as
an instrument for the cohort sizes. To support my argument, I then show that rainfall affects
the infant mortality rate, and hence birth cohort sizes. Finally, I show that youth bulges also
drive low-level social violence in Africa.
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1 Introduction
Civil wars and the accompanying violence not only inflict severe human suffering, but are also seen
as a main impediment to economic development and a main constraint on meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (World Bank, 2011). Especially, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been plagued
by civil wars, it also comprises most of the world’s least developed countries. War and post-
war economies are heavily burdened by death and displacement and as well as labor force and
human capital losses. While the results of civil wars are undoubtedly devastating, there is limited
agreement on what causes the onset of civil conflicts.
Young men are generally identified as being among the main perpetrators in civil conflicts,
since rebel forces rely on this population group. Accordingly, a link between the size of youth
cohorts and political violence is highlighted in the prominent theoretical arguments of Goldstone
(1991) and Goldstone (2010). As a result, there is an increasing interest to establish and quantify
the effect of fluctuations in the cohort size of the male youth population (youth bulges)1 on the
likelihood of political violence and civil wars (Urdal, 2006; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009).
In the case of SSA, the impact of large youth cohorts on civil wars is particularly important. This is
because SSA is a region, with a very youthful and fast-growing population which will experience
a high level of youth population pressure in the years to come—especially, in the light of its rigid
economic systems and already strained labor markets (World Bank, 2009; Urdal, 2012).
Assessing the impact of cycles of youth bulges on the onset of civil conflicts is difficult, owing
to the problem of omitted variable bias and endogeneity. To my knowledge, these problems are not
rigorously addressed in the existing literature, which makes it difficult to leap from correlation to
causality. For example, endogeneity might weigh heavily, as civil conflict affects population sizes
through death and displacement. The bias is even amplified in the case of the standard measure2 of
relative youth bulges—youth relative to total (adult) population—which is essentially constructed
from two variables. For example, civil war might hurt the elderly and children disproportionately
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). This increases the relative size of the youth bulge at the onset of
civil conflict and, as a consequence, leads to a spurious correlation.3
To avoid these traps, I employ the absolute size of the age cohort-specific population. This
is feasible, since I only use time-detrended and hence trend-stationary within-country variation.
Basically, I evaluate wether we can observe on average more onsets of civil conflicts in years with
country-specific positive shocks in the size of the male youth population, holding all other social
and economic conditions constant.
1In this study, I refer to the youth bulge as the absolute size of the respective male youth population cohort. The
relative youth bulge refers to the relative size of the youth population to the total population.
2See for example Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Urdal (2006).
3There are additional problems that stem from the relative measure of youth bulges which I discuss below.
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To address the endogeneity and omitted variable problem, I use exogenous historical rainfall
variation in the birth years of the respective age cohorts as an instrument for the latter’s size. Rain-
fall is a plausible instrument in the case of developing countries, since rural income in rainfed
farming systems and hence child nutrition and health services depend on it (Devereux, 2009). Fur-
thermore, it is well known that infants are especially vulnerable, owing mostly to malnutrition, to
negative income shocks which result in increased infant mortality (Baird, Friedman, and Schady,
2011; Rice et al., 2000). I argue and show that, in regions where available income and conse-
quently nutrition and medical care depend on rainfed agricultural output, rainfall variation leads to
fluctuations in the infant mortality rate and hence to cohort-size fluctuations. On the other hand, I
show that the signal of historical short-term rainfall shocks disipates quickly enough such that by
the time a given age cohort reaches the age of 15 no effect can be attributed to current socioeco-
nomic effects. Thus, I identify the size of the male youth population with weather shocks in the
respective birth years. These weather shocks are independent of any other variables influencing
civil conflict, in particular current income.
My study concentrates on SSA, as this region relies to 96 percent4 on rainfed agriculture and
experiences the world’s most dynamic population. Additionally, the region suffers from high child
mortality, owing to malnutrition and poor medical care. It also includes most of the least developed
countries and is one of the regions most prone to civil war.
Combining the Uppsala/PRIO dataset on civil conflicts of Gleditsch et al. (2002) with the
GPCC rainfall data, I show for SSA, 1960-2009, that the population size of male youth aged 15–
19 is significantly positively related to the risk of civil war onset. My point estimates suggest
a considerable leverage effect. An increase of one percent in the male population aged 15–19
increases the likelihood of the outbreak of civil conflict by 1.4 percentage points. Rainfall shocks
affect both the size of the cohort aged 15–19 and the onset of civil war, with a time lag of 17 to 19
years. Thus, on average, there is a youth bulge effect on the onset of civil conflict after 17 to 19
years. This places the relevant cohort size for triggering civil war at an age (15–19) when labor-
force entry and transition into adulthood in SSA take place (Garcia and Fares, 2008) and the critical
age with respect to male physical violence and aggression is reached. In turn, the data reveals a
significant negative relationship between the risk of conflict and the size of the male population
aged 40–44. Increasing this cohort by one percent decreases the risk of conflict by 0.8 percentage
points.
I argue by means of a simple formalized relationship that large population cohorts contribute to
the change over time in the risk of civil conflict at two points: At the age of 15–19 when they boost
the size of the pool of potential recruits (PR)—by higher marginalization (intensive) and larger
numbers (extensive)—and again at the age of 40–44 when the respective cohort transits out of the
4See World Bank (2008).
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pool of PR.5 Large youth cohorts experience a higher marginalization rate, since transition into the
pool of PR and into the labor market takes place at the same age (15–19). This transition towards
the labor market is, however, associated with a bottleneck effect which spurs marginalization, due
to rigid economic and political institutions. Thus, a large male cohort elevates the risk level at the
age 15–19 until the age 40–44 when the cohort drops out of the pool of PR. This is consistent with
the literature which indicates a heavy concentration in the mass of battle related deaths for the male
population aged 15–44 (Murray et al., 2002). Importantly, my results suggest that youth bulges
trigger conflict by inducing fluctuations in the size of the pool of PR. However, they do not imply
that male youth aged 15–19 account for the majority of the rebel army recruits.
The data also shows that various factors that improve economic perspectives hamper the im-
pact of the youth bulge. For example, high contemporaneous rainfall and, as a consequence, higher
agricultural income reduces the risk of civil conflict attributable to youth bulges. Thus, the results
suggest that youth bulges increase the number of marginalized youth, since the rigid economic and
political systems in SSA are not capable of absorbing exceptionally large youth cohorts. Marginal-
ized youth with low opportunity costs reduce recruitment costs and make insurgencies more likely.
This highlights the importance of the marginalization effects in the context of youth bulges. To
confirm these findings, I show that youth bulges also trigger the onset of low-level social violence
(SCAD dataset).
The second main result is that, in fact, contemporaneous rainfall shocks negatively affect infant
mortality via agricultural output in the SSA sample. This links weather shocks directly to the age
cohort-specific population size. My results, therefore, stress the importance of fluctuations in the
size of the male youth population for the likelihood of civil conflicts. Since large population
cohorts are a recurrent phenomenon, my results are also able to explain the cycles of civil conflicts
found in many countries (World Bank, 2011).
In Section 2, I discuss the underlying mechanisms and review the relevant literature. In Section
3 and 4, I discuss data and methodology. Section 5 and 6 present the results, and Section 7 and 8
include additional consistency checks. Section 9 concludes.
2 Discussion of Mechanisms and Literature
In this section, I discuss the mechanisms between birth-year rainfall and cohort-size fluctuations
as well as youth bulges and civil conflict. Additionally, I review the relevant literature.
5That is, only when males aged 15–19, on average, become recruitable.
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Weather Shocks and Infant Mortality
In rainfed agricultural systems, such as those in SSA, agricultural output and hence available an-
nual household income depends on a sufficient rainy season. Insufficient rainfall can cause crop
failure and a food crisis for large rural populations that lives as subsistence oriented farmers (Dev-
ereux, 2009). Under such circumstances rural income is determined by exogenous weather shocks.
Agricultural rural households employ several coping strategies when exposed to a poor rainy
season and hence to a negative income shock. Three central strategies are: reducing food con-
sumption, increasing distress maternal labor supply, and cutting health service expenses (Devereux,
2009; Bhalotra, 2010). All three are determinants of the likelihood of infant survival. Additionally,
ample evidence exists that infant survival is particularly, if not almost exclusively, vulnerable to
malnutrition.6 UNICEF (2012) reports that child mortality is highest in SSA, and more than a third
of child deaths can be attributed to malnutrition. The region also exhibits a high risk of neonatal
deaths, emphasizing the importance of the first months of life for survival.
Baird, Friedman, and Schady (2011) exploit panel data on income and child mortality for a
sample of developing countries, including SSA. The authors find a negative relationship between
income and child mortality; in particular, infant mortality in the first months of life. All these
studies point out that infant mortality in rural areas depends crucially on the income that is deter-
mined by sufficient rainfall. The findings imply that a large share of rural dwellers in developing
countries—and especially in SSA—live under conditions, where fluctuations in rainfall impacts
the survival of infants.
In regions that depend on rainfed agricultural output, variation in rainfall levels is expected to
cause fluctuations in the annual size of male (and female) birth cohorts. Building on this literature,
I confirm below that infant mortality is affected by levels of agricultural output and rainfall.
Youth Bulges and Civil Wars
My paper is related to the empirical literature on the determinants of civil war. Blattman and
Miguel (2010) give a comprehensive review of the literature. Several of these studies include de-
mographic measures of youth population in their analysis, because they fit into several theoretical
structures on the causes of civil war onset. The literature, however, delivers ambiguous results
on the interdependence between relative youth bulges and civil conflict onset. Both Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find no evidence to support a link between the per-
centage of young men in the total population and the outbreak of civil war. Within the same strand
of literature, Urdal (2006) finds that the number of young men as a share of the adult population
6See for example Rice et al. (2000) for a review.
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is positively and significantly7 associated with an increased risk of armed civil conflict, terrorism
and riots. These papers employ the share of young men in the total (adult) population, which
seems problematic, owing to the issues described below. As an additional distinction, I address the
endogeneity and omitted variable problem by applying an instrumental variable framework. As
described in the introduction, both phenomena are likely to play a prominent role in the regression
estimations, leading to reversed causality and spurious correlations.
Another strand of literature relates country-specific total population size to civil conflict (Brück-
ner, 2010; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). My study is set apart from this literature, since it
stresses the importance of distinguishing between different population age groups. For example,
the setup in Brückner (2010) does not allow him to identify and isolate effects of particular pop-
ulation groups, since the first-stage instrument affects the total population across all population
groups. In turn, I am able to identify and separate the effect of youth population size on the onset
of civil conflict.
My study relates to Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), who show that negative rainfall
shocks, as an income instrument for a sample of SSA countries between 1981 and 1999, lead to
a significant increase in the probability of civil war. The authors find that exogenous short-run
variation in rainfall growth affects contemporaneous economic growth and, as a result, triggers the
incidence of civil war in the following period. In this paper, I use level rainfall variation which
generates, via agricultural output, fluctuations in the birth cohort population size for a much longer
sample period (1960-2009). I then show how such fluctuations in cohort sizes, induced by rainfall
shocks, trigger civil conflict onsets with an average lag of 17 to 19 years. For my sample, I find
no significant effect of a contemporaneous or a one-year level of lagged rainfall on the onset of
conflict. Also, GDP per capita is not significantly related to contemporaneous rainfall. However,
in my sample a strongly positive and significant relationship can be observed between contempo-
raneous rainfall and agricultural output per capita. This indicates that for my sample the signal
of contemporaneous rainfall—through agricultural output—is not strong enough to induce observ-
able changes in aggregate GDP, which also includes the service and the manufacturing sector.8 In
particular, the noise generated by the latter sectors seems to override the agriculture production
signal.
Nevertheless, I am able to confirm the findings of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), in
the sense that youth bulge effects are more pronounced in years of low agricultural income (low
rainfall years). Similarly, my results directly relate to the work of Nunn and Qian (2012) who show
that food aid increases the risk of conflict by increasing rebel resources (looting). Even though I
7Similarly, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) argue in favor of the existence of a youth bulge effect. However,
the youth bulge measure in Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) is mostly non-significant at the ten-percent level.
8Please see Miguel and Satyanath (2011) and Ciccone (2011) for further discussion on the interrelationship between
rainfall and GDP over time.
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also find a negative overall effect of foreign aid, my results highlight that foreign aid reduces the
risk of civil conflict through youth bulges.
My work resonates with Goldstone (1991) who points out that population pressure, induced by
variation in the mortality rate, caused revolutions in the pre- and early industrialized era. It also
presents direct links to other studies which stress the interrelationship between climate conditions
and civil conflict (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane, 2011; Burke et al., 2009).
The Mechanism and Measure of Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict
In this subsection, I, first, briefly discuss the mechanism between youth bulges and conflict, and
afterwards discuss some important aspects of defining youth bulges as a measure.
The Mechanism of Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict
Africa’s rebel armies mostly operate, hide and recruit in the (rural) hinterland where government
power is weak (Herbst, 2000, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sommers, 2003). For an insurgency
to be feasible, a sufficiently large pool of potential recruits (PR) must exist, since Africa’s insur-
gencies depend almost exclusively on foot soldiers (Okumu and Ikelegbe, 2010).9 This stock of PR
usually consists of members of the marginalized male population aged 15–44, e.g., Murray et al.
(2002) show that the majority of battle-related deaths are concentrated within this group. Thus,
age cohorts enter this pool when they transit from adolescence into adulthood at ages ranging from
about 15 to 20 and leave this pool in their mid-forties.
In turn, economic and social marginalization is a precondition that motivates a fraction of this
particular age group (15–44) to actually join rebel ranks. This relates especially to large youth
cohorts which transit from school into the labor market: here, both transition events, towards
adulthood and towards labor market participation, usually coincide between the age of 15 and 20
(Garcia and Fares, 2008; Smith, 2011). In particular, the labor markets and political systems in
rural and subsistence agriculture dominated SSA—with its rigid socio-economic structure, still
accounting for two-thirds of the African labor force (CTA, 2012)—are unable to absorb excep-
tionally large youth cohorts and provide an adequate quantity and quality of labor opportunities
(Garcia and Fares, 2008; Chandrasekhar, Ghosh, and Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, when a youth
bulge hits the labor market, an excess labor supply for available jobs develops, the bottleneck effect
occurs, consequently increasing the fraction of marginalized young males.
This allows me to formalize a simple relationship. Let X(T ) be the population size of a male
cohort born in year T that carries its specific marginalization rate, α(X(T )), and where α(X(T )) ∈
[0, 1]. Thus, the marginalization rate depends on the cohort size; e.g., through a bottleneck effect on
9Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) discuss a similar argument.
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the labor market. The age of this particular cohort in year t is age(t) = t−T . Then the pool of PR
is defined as PR(t) =
∫ t−in
T=t−out α(X(T ))X(T ) dT . It is determined by all cohorts aged between
the transition-age ’into’, age(t) ≥ in, and the transition-age ’out’, age(t) ≤ out, weighted by the
fraction of the marginalized population within each cohort. Now, let the probability of conflict,
onset(t), depend on the pool of PR
onset(t) = onset(PR(t)) = onset
 t−in∫
T=t−out
α(X(T ))X(T ) dT
 . (1)
with
∂onset(t)
∂t
= X (Tin(t))α (X(Tin)) onset′ (PR)−X (Tout(t))α (X(Tout)) onset′ (PR) , (2)
with Tin(t) being the birth year of the cohort that transits into the pool of PR in year t; and Tout(t)
being the upper-bound birth year which governs the transition out of PR; and onset′ (PR) > 0
being the derivative of conflict risk to PR.
Equation (2) implies that changes over time in the risk of civil conflict are determined by the
size of the cohort fluctuations that shift into and out of the pool of PR. That is, as an exceptionally
large youth cohort enters the critical age in, it raises the risk of civil conflict to a new level. This,
however, takes place along two dimensions. Firstly, the population size between in and out owing
to a youth shock. Secondly, the particular large youth cohort which transits into the PR pool
also experiences a particularly high marginalization—as this cohort simultaneously transits into
the labor market, where it experiences a bottleneck effect. Thus, the fact that the youth cohorts
which transit into the pool of PR simulaneously transit into the labor market, make youth bulges
especially important to changes in the risk of civil conflict. It is also clear that as long as a large
cohort remains within the pool of PR, the risk level itself remains high (Figure A.II). However, the
risk level changes only when an exceptionally large cohort enters and exits the interval [in, out].
Similarly, the empirical analysis below looks at changes in the risk of conflict, since it only exploits
variation over time (fixed effects).
In turn, Eq. (2) does not relate to the age composition of recruits that participate in conflicts.
This composition depends on the relative size of each age cohort within the age range 15–44 and
its respective marginalization rate. Hence, males aged 15-20 might not even constitute the majority
of rebel fighters. In this context, youth bulges do not explain the duration of civil conflicts which
is also rejected by the data. The literature even indicates that larger insurgencies might even be
of shorter duration (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). Hence, the sustainability of
conflict (duration) does not appear to depend on an additional supply of young males. However, I
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show below that not only civil conflict, but also the onset of low-level social violence (SCAD) is
affected by youth bulges.
Youth Bulge Measures
Assume that a country i possesses the equilibrium capacity in economic and political institutions
to absorb X(Tin)i of male youth, where the term youth population signifies the age cohort that
transits into the labor market (pool of PR). Hence—given a positive youth population shock—the
size of the (marginalized) excess youth labor can be written as X(Tin)i,t − X(Tin)i = Ψ > 0.
Thus, the positive deviation from the equilibrium number of male youth Ψ transits into the pool of
potential recruits for insurgencies, which, in turn, increases the risk of conflict. In terms of a linear
model, with onseti,t, the probability of the onset of civil conflict, this can be formulated as follows:
onseti,t = α (X(Tin)i,t −X(Tin)i) + β xi,t = αΨ + β xi,t, (3)
where xi,t are additional factors like, such as the population structure or political institutions. Now
let xi,t move to the error term ui,t which yields
onseti,t = α (X(Tin)i,t −X(Tin)i) + ui,t = αΨ + ui,t. (4)
However, this simply represents the fixed effects regression model in Eq. (5), assuming that the
country-specific mean corresponds to the equilibrium number of male youth. Now, if it is possible
to identify these country-specific fluctuations around the equilibrium (E(X(Tin)i,tui,t) = 0), then
we can estimate its effect on the risk of civil conflict, holding everything else constant—including
labor market conditions, population structure and political institutions. It is important to stress
that this does not imply that countries with a generally larger population are more prone to civil
conflict. However, countries with larger positive deviations from their respective youth-population
country mean are more prone to civil conflict.
In turn, a scaled youth-bulge measure (e.g., the male youth population relative to total pop-
ulation) makes the seperation between effects of youth population fluctuations and changes in
population structure difficult. For example, define the youth share Si,t =
X(Tin)i,t
Pi,t
, with Pi,t the
total population. Assume cov(X(Tin)i,t, Oi,t) > 0, with Oi,t = onseti,t from above and where cov
is the covariance. It then follows that cov(Si,t, Oi,t) > 0, since cov(X(Tin)i,t, Si,t) > 0.
On the other hand, assume cov(Pi,t, Oi,t|X(Tin)i,t) ≤ 0 and it then follows10 that cov(Si,t, Oi,t) ≤
0, since cov(Pi,t, Si,t|X(Tin)i,t) < 0. Thus, the share declines owing to an increase in the residual
10For example, the HIV epidemic in SSA led to a severe decline in the population aged 30−−39 (United Nations,
2003). This drop in the adult population even led to a decline in the number of marginalized youth through better
employment opportunities—that is cov(Si,t, Oi,t) < 0 (Coulibaly, 2004).
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population—total population minus youth population—which might stem from a birth-rate surge.
Thus, an increasing share might increase the risk of civil conflict or not, which depends on the
underlying mechanism of S˙i,t =
∂Si,t
∂t
. In this case, it is not possible to separate the effect of youth
pressure from other population factors. However, by using absolute numbers X(Tin)i,t − X¯i as
described above, allows me to hold Pi,t|X(Tin)i,t constant if identification of X(Tin)i,t is possible.
Nevertheless, by employing a 2SLS framework to identify the youth population size X(Tin)i,t,
it is still possible to separate the effects; in particular, it is possible to hold Pi,t constant within the
youth share. In the next section, I show that using the share yields similar results.11
3 Data
My sample period for SSA covers the period from 1960 to 2009 (this being a much longer time
frame than is used elsewhere in this field). The conflict data with at least 25 battle deaths is from
the PRIO/Upsalla database, where I include only civil conflicts of type 3 and 4 that are fought in
a country’s own territory, this being closer to the context of youth bulges.12 I code the onset of
a civil conflict as one if there is a conflict in progress in the current year, but no conflict in the
previous year. All years with no conflicts are coded as zero. All conflict years that follow on a
preceding conflict year are coded missing. This corresponds to the onset definition of Themnér
and Wallensteen (2012). Substantial differences exist, however, in coding the onset of conflict
(Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). My results are robust to changes
in definition, as shown in the Appendix A.I.
To show that youth bulges also induce low-level social violence, I employ the Social Conflict in
the Africa Database (SCAD) from Hendrix and Salehyan (2013). I code the onset of social violence
for a given year as one if at least one violent event begins in that year (start year). All other years
are coded as zero. Since birth-year rainfall-induced youth bulges are mostly important to rural
and remote areas—due to rainfed agriculture—I drop all events that can be explicitly attributed to
urban areas.
The evaluation of population effects through instrumentalizing their birth-year rainfall events
requires a considerable lead time in the rainfall data (up to 30-50 years). Thus, a sufficiently long
time series is needed which excludes all satellite-based datasets. My base rainfall data is drawn
from the GPCC Full Data Reanalysis (Version 6) of Schneider et al. (2011) under the auspices
of the World Meteorological Organization. It is a gridded monthly mean precipitation database
at the 1◦x1◦grid level using spatial interpolation and starts from 1901. It is the most accurate
11By employing the instrument zi,t which satisfies cov(zi,t, X(Tin)i,t) 6= 0 and cov(zi,t, ui,t) = 0 ⇒
cov(zi,t, Pi,t|X(Tin)i,t) = 0, we have cov(zi,tSi,t) = cov(zi,t, X(Tin)i,t) 6= 0.
12In the PRIO data, sideA and location coincide for type 3 and 4.
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product within the GPCC product class, where the GPCC dataset contains the largest monthly
precipitation database in the world. It is superior to most other available datasets on precipitation,
both in terms of station density and quality control (Schneider et al., 2013). Further, it builds the
in situ component for the widely used GPCP dataset. To derive country-specific yearly rainfall
values, I follow Miguel and Satyanath (2011).13 For comparison, the correlation between the
GPCC-based rainfall data used here and the GPCP rainfall data (satellite based) used in Miguel
and Satyanath (2011) is 0.94 for the period 1981-2009 (obs=1019). To show that the results are
not driven by a particular precipitation dataset, I also use the "Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2010
Gridded Monthly Time Series (V 3.01)" (Delaware) dataset from Matsuura and Willmott (2012)
and the 1948-2010 "PRECipitation REConstruction over Land" (PREC/L) dataset (Chen et al.,
2002).14
The data on the age distributions and total population are from World Population Prospects
(2010 Revision). These data are decomposed into five-year age groups, such that it is possible, for
example, to observe fluctuations in the age group 15–19. Real GDP per capita and real openness
are drawn from the Penn World Tables. The data on the live birth rate, the infant mortality rate,
foreign aid in current U.S. dollars and urbanization is from the World Development Indicators. The
democracy score (revised combined Polity score) is from the Polity IV dataset. The net agricultural
production per capita index and the net agricultural capital stock in constant prices are from the
FAO.
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Figure I: (A) SSA average of the log men15–19 deviation from its mean. (B) SSA average of the log men15–19
residuals (mean deviation) purged by country-specific time trends, country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
According to Section 2, I expect that the cohort size fluctuations in the male population aged
13Basically, I use the rainfall values of grids that have the grid center inside the country polygon from GADM
http:www.gadm.org.
14The PREC/L precipitation data is provided by the NOAA/OAR/ESRL PSD, Boulder, Colorado, USA, from their
Web site at http:www.esrl.noaa.govpsd.
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15–19 are crucial for the onset of civil conflict. In particular, it is suspected that positive deviations
from the country mean (shocks) in this age group trigger conflict. Figure I displays the develop-
ment of the average across the SSA countries from 1960 to 2009 relative to the mean. It is obvious
that the data is not trend stationary. Thus, we find positive deviation from the mean after the mid-
1980s and negative deviation before that. To remedy this problem, I control for country-specific
time trends, time fixed effects and country fixed effects. Figure I shows the average purged data
series which now fluctuates evenly around the mean. Thus, by controlling for these time effects
in the regressions below, the youth population data becomes trend stationary. This problem is fur-
ther mitigated by the fact that I use the trend stationary and exogenous rainfall data as a source of
variation in my instrumental variable setup.
Generally, it is not feasible to employ growth rates of the male population aged 15–19, due to
the fact that positive growth rates do not necessarily reflect a positive—and hence exceptional—
deviation from the country-specific mean. That is, we might observe positive growth rates, even
though the youth population size is below its country mean and recovering from a preceding neg-
ative shock.
4 Empirical Strategy
The setup described here for the case of the onset of civil conflict in SSA applies similarly to the
onset of low-level social violence. It also applies to the cohort size aged 40–44, m40–44i,t, which
the discussion above associates with a moderating effect on the risk of conflict.
From the literature, it is to be expected that the critical age cohort X(Tin), Eq. (2), can be
found within the population aged 15–19. My equation of interest, with log m15–19i,t the size of
the male youth population aged 15–19 for country i in year t in log, is therefore
onseti,t = αi + γi t+ Tt + θ log m15–19i,t + ui,t
= γi t+ Tt + θ (log m15–19i,t − log m15–19i) + (ui,t − u¯i),
(5)
where onseti,t is the binary variable onset of civil conflict; γi t and Tt are country-specific time
trends and time fixed effects, respectively. Including country-fixed effects in the panel setup allows
me to rewrite the model as a mean deviation process, where log m15–19i is the country-specific
mean in log. It is important to stress that Eq. (5) is an approximation in the sense that the true age
of the cohort(s) that transits into the pool of PR, X(Tin), is not known ex-ante. It might be that on
average the transition age is located at, e.g., 17 or that the transition period covers the whole range
of cohorts aged 15–19; that is, X(Tin) ⊆ m15–19i,t. However, because the population data covers
only five-year age groups, it is not possible to observe each age cohort separately.
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Since identification might not be possible in Eq. (5), I employ birth-year rainfall variation as
an instrument for the cohort size. To test if the rainfall shocks in the birth year affect the size of the
respective cohorts of interest, and because these cohorts cover 5 years, I regress the log number of
males aged 15–19 (log m15–19i,t) on the log rainfall levels of the relevant birth years (log raini,t−15
to log raini,t−19),
log m15–19i,t = αi + γi t+ Tt + β{t−15,..,t−19} log raini,{t−15,..,t−19} + vi,t, (6)
with {t − 15, .., t − 19} capturing the sequence from t − 17 to t − 19; vi,t being an idiosyncratic
error term; and β capturing the effect of the birth year-specific rainfall on the cohort size.
Likewise, rainfall is expected to affect the onset of civil conflict with a lag of 15 to 19 years,
since the critical age of transition (Tin) from school (childhood) to the labor market and into the
pool of PR is between 15–19 (Section 2), and the cohort sizes are governed by birth annual rainfall.
Hence, I use a similar setup to Eq. (6), to test the interdependence of lagged rainfall and civil
conflict, but now using the onset of civil conflict as the dependent variable,
onseti,t = αi + σi t+ Tt + λ{t−15,..,t−19} log raini,{t−15,..,t−19} + ei,t, (7)
where ei,t is an idiosyncratic error term, and where λ captures the effect of past rain shocks on
the onset of civil conflict. Similarly to (5), it is not known ex-ante which particular lagged rainfall
event in the range t − 15 to t − 19 affects civil conflict. From the theory above, I expect that the
birth-year rainfall event that corresponds to the age cohort X(Tin) has a significant impact on the
onset of conflict. However, the particular rainfall event or group of events is not known ex-ante.
This setup then allows me to employ a 2SLS framework, using rainfall in the birth year as an
instrument. It facilitates determining the true effect of youth bulges on the onset of civil war under
the assumption that rainfall in the birth year of the critical age cohort does not affect civil conflict
through another channel. Thus, the estimation procedure requires that rain shock effects disperse
fast enough. Given that my analysis focuses on the short-run effects on the respective variables,
this seems plausible. Furthermore, since the five-year age cohort is affected by more than one year
of rainfall, I am able to test the exclusion restriction.
5 Main Results - Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict
The central focus of this paper concerns youth bulge effects, which constitute most of the discus-
sion below. However, as outlined above, I also expect there to be a moderating effect on conflict
by large cohorts aged 40–44; that is, when these cohorts transit out of the pool of PR. I present
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estimates on the latter effect in Section 5.4. Before discussing the main regression results, I discuss
several nonparametric estimates of youth cohort size and the onset of civil conflict. Subsequently,
I present the results of the first-stage and instrumental variable estimations.
5.1 Nonparametric Estimations and Scatterplots
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Figure II: (A) SSA sample of log men 15–19 on onset of civil conflict. (B) SSA sample, excluding the observation for
Rwanda in 1996. Nonparametric local polynomial estimates and 95-percent confidence interval (dashed). Residuals
are purged by time trend, country-specific time trends, country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
Figure II displays nonparametric local polynomial estimations of the residuals of the male
cohort size aged 15–19 on the residuals of the onset of civil conflict.15 Figure II(A) shows that
the relationship is negative at first and then becomes positive; that is, in contrast to the monotonic
and positive relationship which was expected. However, the estimation precision at the left-end
is extremely low, owing to sparse observations. Additionally, the negative relationship is purely
driven by the observation for the onset of civil conflict in Rwanda in 1996, which is highlighted
in Figure A.I in the Appendix. Dropping the observation results in a strictly positive relationship
between the youth male cohort size and the onset of civil conflict, as depicted in Figure II(B).
However, dropping this particular outlier from the regressions below does not affect the results and
is subsequently not excluded from the sample.
This first glance at the data indicates that, in fact, youth bulges and civil conflict are positively
interrelated. Additional support is highlighted in Figure A.I. The bar charts to the left and right
of the line through the origin (x-axis) indicate that onset events are on average associated with
positive residuals of the male population size aged 15–19 (mean at 0). Thus, in 60 percent of all
15The residuals are obtained by purging the raw data of country-specific time trends, time fixed effects and country
fixed effects.
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Figure III: (A) SSA sample of log rainfall t−17 on onset of civil conflict. (B) SSA sample of log men 15–19 on onset
of civil conflict. Nonparametric local polynomial estimates and 95-percent confidence interval (dashed). The vertical
lines mark the top and bottom percentile of the rainfall data. Residuals are purged by time trend, country-specific time
trends, country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
cases, the onset of civil war falls within a period where the male youth population is above the
mean.
Next, Figure III depicts the nonparametric estimates of the relationship between lag t − 17
rainfall and the onset of civil conflict, and lag t − 17 rainfall and males aged 15–19 in Figure
III(A) and Figure III(B), respectively. The figure also includes vertical lines which indicate the
demarcation of the bottom and top percentile of the rainfall data. To the left and the right of
the vertical lines, the estimates become imprecise, owing to limited observations. Ignoring these
outliers, the plots indicate a mostly positive and monotonic relationship for both the onset of civil
conflict and the male youth population. In order to assert that the estimates are not driven by the
outliers in the top and bottom percentile of the rainfall data, I also run regressions excluding these
observations.
5.2 Rainfall, Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict
In this subsection, I discuss the direct effects of the respective birth year rainfall events on the
cohort size of males aged 15–19 and the onset of civil conflict. Then, I discuss the identification
strategy. It is important to stress that this analysis is concerned with the question of whether
large youth population sizes induce fluctuations in the risk of civil conflict over time. It does
not, however, answer the question as to which particular age cohorts are actually engaged in civil
conflict—the population composition of the rebel armies.
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Table I: Civil Conflict, Youth Bulge and Rainfall (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Log Men15–19t Onset Civil Conflictt
(1)a (2) (3) (4)b (5) (6)
Log raint−15 0.030* -0.009
(0.016) (0.029)
Log raint−16 0.028** -0.003
(0.014) (0.030)
Log raint−17 0.040*** 0.040** 0.055** 0.054**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020)
Log raint−18 0.026* 0.015
(0.014) (0.032)
Log raint−19 0.016 0.058**
(0.016) (0.024)
Log rain{t−17,..,t−19} 0.083** 0.135***
(0.041) (0.048)
Obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
RMSE 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.206 0.206 0.205
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dum-
mies, country-specific time trends, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in
parentheses. rain{t−17,..,t−19} is the average rainfall for the lags t− 17 to t− 19.
aCoefficients of lag rainfall t− 15 to t− 19 are the same (p-value 0.54).
bCoefficients of lag rainfall t− 17 to t− 19 are the same (p-value 0.45).
First-Stage and Reduced-Form Estimates
Table I, columns 1-3, show the results of lagged rainfall levels on the cohort size of young men aged
15–19. I report least square estimates with robust (Eicker-Huber-White) standard errors clustered
at the country and year level.
I expect that rainfall shocks at birth affect cohort sizes. Since the dependent variable is a co-
hort spanning five years, there are five potential rainfall events, each affecting annual birth cohorts
which, in addition, overlap.16 Except for the lag t − 19, the lag rainfall levels enter at least sig-
nificant at the ten-percent level. However, I cannot reject the hypothesis (p-value 0.54) that all
birth year rainfall events have the same coefficient size. Thus, the data reveals that these birth year
rainfall events contribute in a similar way to fluctuations in the cohort size of males aged 15–19.
Due to the results discussed shortly, I focus on the lag t − 17 (column 2). However, the estimates
do not rely on this particular lag, and I also present results using the average rainfall from t − 17
to t− 19 (column 3).
Next, I turn to the supposition that civil conflict is more likely when large cohorts of young
males, on average, transit into the labor market and into the pool of PR. Following this argument,
it is to be expected that rainfall shocks in the range between t− 15 and t− 19 are likely to have an
impact on the likelihood of civil conflict starting. It is, however, ex-ante not clear which particular
16That is, infants born in summer are still infants in the subsequent year.
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Table II: Onset of Civil Conflict and Rainfall Lags - Youth Bulge
Rainfall lags: t+1 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9
Onset 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.038 -0.037 0.002 -0.005 -0.000 -0.057 -0.025 0.029
conflictt (0.020) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.023)
t-10 t-11 t-12 t-13 t-14 t-15 t-16 t-17 t-18 t-19 t-20
0.000 -0.006 -0.034 -0.021 0.028 -0.005 -0.011 0.048** 0.015 0.056* -0.029
(0.043) (0.039) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032)
t-21 t-22 t-23 t-24 t-25 t-26 t-27 t-28 t-29
0.015 -0.020 0.001 0.032 0.014 -0.032 0.003 -0.025 0.046
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040) (0.027) (0.040) (0.026) (0.035)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Table shows the regression results of the onset of civil conflict on the rainfall
lags t + 1 to t− 29. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends, time dummies and
robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses. 1,754 Observations.
age cohorts out of the age range 15–19 actually induce changes in the likelihood of conflict. In
particular, it is not known at which age youth cohorts transit into the pool of PR. Hence, it is
necessary to identify the cohorts which represent X(Tin) in Eq. (2). Column 4, in fact, depicts a
significant and positive impact of rainfall shocks on the onset of civil conflict with a lag of between
17 and 19 years. However, I cannot reject the hypothesis (p-value 0.45) that the t − 17 to t − 19
rainfall events enter with a similar coefficient size. Thus, the data suggest that the relevant group,
which triggers—by increasing the pool of PR (X(Tin))—the onset of civil conflict, is aged 17–19.
Again, columns 5-6 show the isolated effect of the t − 17 lag and of the average lag from t − 17
to t− 19. Further, Table A.I, columns 1-2, show that these findings are robust to a dynamic panel
specification for both OLS and system GMM.
It is important to assure that these effects are not driven by some cross-correlation with other
lag rainfall events. To test for such a possibility, I include further sets of lagged rainfall levels (t+1
to t − 29) in Table II. This does not alter the estimates of the coefficients t − 17 to t − 19. None
of the additional lags enter significantly at the ten-percent level. My estimates suggest that rainfall
shocks in SSA affect the onset of civil conflict with an average lag of 17–19 years. The argument
above relates this finding to a youth bulge effect, because the same lag induces fluctuations in the
relevant male age cohort, which, as a consequence, induces fluctuations in the pool of PR. Thus,
the data suggests that the full set 15–19 does not transit into the pool of PR, but that only—on
average within this sample—the age group 17-19 does. Employing the rainfall levels t− 17 allows
me then to identify the part of the population 15–19 which is affected by this particular rainfall
event.
Next, Table A.II in the Appendix depicts the results from regressions of the t−15 to t−19 rain-
fall levels on various contemporaneous covariates. The exercise shows that these lagged rainfall
levels do not influence the risk of civil conflict through potential contemporaneous confounders—
for example, dynamic effects of lower levels of investment during a low rainfall year fifteen years
ago. The results highlight that potential contemporaneous rainfall effects on economic and social
17
outcomes—which might be related to the risk of conflict—disperse fast enough such that they do
not explain variation in these outcomes after 15 years. This is plausible, since there is no reason to
believe that changes in variables like GDP per capita or (real) capital only affect the onset of civil
conflict exactly with a lag time of 17–19 years, but have no immediate impact. By means of Figure
A.II, this translates to the question why a real capital bulge should affect the risk of conflict only
after seventeen years. In particular, the advancing age of real capital generally does not increase the
risk of conflict.17 In turn, fluctuations in birth cohort sizes matter—in my argument—only when
this specific population cohort is aged 17–19 years, the age at which youth can be drafted into rebel
armies. Furthermore, I cannot imagine any other factor that changes its risk attribute—with regard
to conflict—with advancing age, except population cohorts.
Identification of the Youth Cohort Size
A fact that is important for this paper’s argument is that contemporaneous rainfall acts exclusively
on the size of the respective birth cohort and not on other cohort sizes. Under this assumption, birth
year rainfall variation identifies the effects of their specific birth cohort sizes, but not population
structure or total population variations.
To test this assumption, I include the log of the remaining population—that is total population
minus males aged 15–19—in the setup in Table III.18 Even though the coefficient sizes of the
rainfall events decline, the overall picture remains the same. Most birth year rainfall lags in column
1 enter significantly at the five-percent level. Again, I cannot reject the hypothesis that all rainfall
lags contribute in the same way to the cohort size variation.
To avoid a misspecification error through a potential bias in the remaining population coeffi-
cient, I employ a 2SLS framework in column 2. I use the average rainfall over ten years from
t − 2 to t − 11 as instrument for the remaining population. This is possible, since the remaining
population includes the age cohorts 2-11 which are highly correlated with their respective birth
year rainfall (t− 2 to t− 11). The various rainfall instruments are orthogonal to each other (Table
A.II). Furthermore, this ten-year rainfall average is uncorrelated with the age cohort 15–19 (Table
A.III). Table III, column 2, shows that misspecification is not a problem, since the effects of the
birth year rainfall events are comparable to column 1.19
In columns 3-7, I move the remaining population, preceding age cohort and subsequent age
cohort to the left-hand side (LHS) of the regression equation. The estimates show that neither the
remaining population, nor the preceding or subsequent age cohort sizes are related to the t− 15 to
17The same holds true for infrastructure and the terms of trade.
18Using total population instead does not affect the result. However, employing the remaining population seems
more intuitive.
19The loss in significance stems from the orthogonality of the respective instrument with the other population
groups.
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Table III: Identification of Male Youth Population
Dependent Log Log remaining Log pop. Log pop.
Variable: men15–19t populationt 20–24t 10-14t
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
(1)a (2)b (3) (4)c (5)d (6) (7)
Log raint−15 0.023* 0.023* 0.007 -0.009 0.012
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Log raint−16 0.027** 0.027** -0.006 -0.010 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Log raint−17 0.034*** 0.034** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
Log raint−18 0.026** 0.026** -0.008 -0.009 0.001 -0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005)
Log raint−19 0.006 0.006 0.017 0.016 0.005 0.001
(0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.008) (0.005)
Log remaining 0.440*** 0.428
populationt (0.092) (0.497)
Log men15–19t 0.320*** 0.359 0.349 0.584*** 0.671***
(0.069) (0.282) (0.375) (0.107) (0.089)
Obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
RMSE 0.059 0.059 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.056 0.051
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Remaining population is Total population − men15_19. FE estimator regressions
in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and
year level in parentheses. RMSE is the root mean square error.
aCoefficients of lag rainfall t− 15 to t− 19 are the same (p-value 0.14).
b 2SLS estimates with rain{t−2,..,t−11} as first stage instrument for remaining population. Please see main text.
c 2SLS estimates: Log men15–19t instrumented by Log rainfall levels t− 15, t− 16, t− 18 and t− 19. The Hansen test statistic
indicates that the instruments are valid (p-value 0.62).
d 2SLS estimates: Log men15–19t instrumented by Log rainfall levels t− 15 and t− 16. The Hansen test statistic indicates that the
instruments are valid (p-value 0.30).
t−19 rainfall after controlling for males 15–19. Conditioning on this age cohort is necessary, since
the age cohorts are correlated. The 2SLS estimates in column 5, where I instrument men 15–19
with some of the birth year rainfall lags, show that misspecification is not an issue. Table A.III,
columns 1-2, in the Appendix depict the 2SLS estimates with similar results for the population
aged 20-24 and 10-14. The table also shows that the birth year rainfall events from t− 15 to t− 19
have no significant effect on the cohort size of males aged 40–44.
The data strongly supports that it is possible to identify cohort sizes with the respective birth
year rainfall events. That is, birth rainfall variation allows me to isolate and separate effects of a
specific age cohort from effects of total population and other age cohorts (e.g., to separate youth
bulge and mid-life moderation effects). Additional support for my identification strategy is pre-
sented in Section 8.
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5.3 Instrumental Variable Approach
In this subsection, I present the 2SLS estimates and subsequently discuss economic and social
conditions that hamper the youth bulge effect. Even though the main identification strategy in
this section is through the lagged rainfall t − 17, the results also hold for different instrument
specifications (Section 8).
Youth Bulges and Civil Conflict
Table IV depicts the 2SLS results, where I instrument the size of the male youth cohort aged 15–19
with the t − 17 lag rainfall. I report the robust standard errors clustered at the country and year
level in parentheses (). For the second-stage estimates, I report the p-values of the Anderson-Rubin
Chi-squared test statistic in the square brackets [] which are robust to weak instruments.20 Since
the first-stage F-statistic of H0 : βt−17 = 0 is about 6.0, the Anderson-Rubin p-values are the
appropriate choice (Andrews and Stock, 2005).21 The 2SLS estimates and the Anderson-Rubin
test statistic require that the model is identified. Hence, I also report the first-stage F-statistics of
the excluded instruments.
Overall, the first-stage F-statistics indicates that the model is identified—with p-values gener-
ally smaller than five percent. The results in Table IV, column 1, depict a broad support for the
youth bulge hypothesis. Increasing the size of the male cohort aged 15–19 by one percent induces
an increase in the likelihood of the onset of civil conflict by 1.4 percentage points. I reason that
rainfall at birth affects the birth cohort size. Hence, by affecting the size of the male youth cohort
that transits into the pool of PR, the t − 17 rainfall lag causes fluctuations in the likelihood of
the onset of civil conflict. Since rainfall is exogenous, I conclude that youth bulges have a causal
effect on the onset of civil conflict. This does not imply, however, that violence is nonexistent in
later age groups. It merely states that this age group—by triggering fluctuations in the stock of
potential recruits (PR)—makes rebel recruitment more feasible and, hence, induces changes in the
likelihood of civil conflict. Intuitively, age cohorts cross the age-threshold to become recruitable
into a rebel army only once.
I turn now to regression setups including additional covariates that are usually found in the
relevant literature. Adding the future, contemporaneous and past log rainfall in columns 2 does
not affect the size of the youth bulge coefficient or its significance. The rainfall levels all enter
nonsignificant, which implies that contemporaneous rainfall does not appear to affect the onset of
civil conflict in my sample, which also holds true for rainfall growth rates (not shown). Thus, the
results of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) do not translate directly to my setup. Also real
20The standard p-values tend towards one in the case of weak instruments (Andrews and Stock, 2005).
21Andrews and Stock (2005) consider an F-statistic smaller than 10.3 as evidence for a weak instrument.
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Table IV: 2SLS Results- Youth Bulge and Civil Conflict
Dependent Variable: Onset Civil Conflictt
(1) (2) (3)a (4) (5) (6) (7)b
Log men15–19t 1.366*** 1.385*** 1.477*** 1.634** 2.269*** 1.192**
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.014] [0.001] [0.050]
Youth sharet 77.289***
[0.001]
Log raint+1 0.007 0.000 -0.003 0.014 0.024 -0.009
(0.024) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.047) (0.036)
Log raint 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.086 0.006
(0.028) (0.034) (0.040) (0.057) (0.033)
Log raint−1 0.020 0.007 -0.001 0.021 0.100** -0.017
(0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.031)
Log GDP p. -0.129 -0.183 -0.160 0.016
capitat (0.111) (0.150) (0.150) (0.026)
Log agricultural 0.278
output p. capitat [0.413]
∆Polity IVt -0.008 -0.013** -0.009**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Log real 0.031 0.102 -0.029
opennesst (0.060) (0.086) (0.038)
Urbanizationt 0.005 0.007 -0.006**
(0.007) (0.014) (0.003)
First stage regression: Log men15–19t (youth share in column 6)
Log raint−17 0.040** 0.040** 0.038** 0.035** 0.031** 0.001** 0.044**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.000) (0.019)
First stage regression: Log agricultural output p. capitat
Log raint 0.074**
(0.031)
Obs. 1754 1754 1639 1523 1523 1523 1523
RMSE 0.222 0.223 0.224 0.231 0.245 0.306 0.235
F-test excl. IV 6.033 5.871 5.58/4.35 6.261 4.169 4.722 5.446
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 2SLS regression with log raint−17 as an instrument for log men15–19 (youth share in column
6) in the first stage. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends (except column 6), time dummies
and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket[] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin
Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. The F-test is the first-stage test statistic of the excluded instrument. RMSE is the root
mean square error. Youth Share is men15-19total population . Agricultural output is measured as the net production value index per capita from the FAO.
∆ Polity IV is the change of the Polity2 score from the Polity IV database. Real openness is from the PWT. Urbanization is the share of urban
population in total.
aIn column 3, 2SLS estimates with log raint as instrument for agricultural output and log raint−17 as instrument for men15–19 in the first stage.
F-test excl. IV in column 3 first gives the value for log raint and then log raint−17.
bIn column 7, I drop the country-specific time trends.
GDP per capita is not significantly related to contemporaneous rainfall in my sample.
However, column 3 (first-stage) shows that agricultural production value per capita is positively
and significantly related to contemporaneous rainfall. This suggests that the noise from other
sectors, like manufacturing and services, override the signal of the rainfall variation—through
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agricultural output—in the aggregated GDP per capita. It also highlights the link between rainfall
and the agricultural sector in rural rainfed SSA which is important to my argument of birth year
rainfall variation, agricultural income and infant mortality. Column 3 also shows the second-stage
estimates, where I use the contemporaneous rainfall as an instrument for agricultural output and
the t−17 rainfall lag as an instrument for the youth measure. The coefficient of agricultural output
is nonsignificant, but the youth bulge effect enters again significant and negative with a value of
1.5.
In column 4, I add real GDP per capita which enters nonsignificant. In the regression reported
in columns 5, I also include a democracy measure, urbanization and real openness to trade. The
variables do not affect the outcome of the youth bulge effect, but even increase its coefficient,
owing partly to a sample size reduction.
To show that the results do not depend on a particular specification, I employ in column 6 the
youth share—male population aged 15–19 relative to total population—as LHS variable. Here the
youth bulge coefficient again enters significantly and positively as before. However, it is important
to stress that identification takes place through the male population aged 15–19. Thus, in this
case, I hold total population constant—conditional on the male youth population—as discussed in
Subsection 5.2. A one-percentage point increase yields an increase in the risk of civil conflict by
0.77 percentage points.22 In column 7, I drop the country-specific time trends, which does not alter
the size or significance of the youth bulge coefficient.
Next, I present additional robustness checks in Appendix A.I. In column 3, I exclude the top
and bottom percentile of the lagged rainfall data, to show that the results are not driven by outliers.
The estimate of the youth bulge coefficient is of similar magnitude and remains significantly at the
five-percent level. Since both female and male cohort sizes are affected by birth rainfall variation,
the t−17 lag rainfall also induces fluctuations in youth female cohorts aged 15–19. Hence, the true
youth bulge effect might stem from young women. However, the literature clearly rejects such a
hypothesis, as do the results in column 4. To show that the results do not rely on a particular onset
specification, Table A.I, columns 5-8, show estimates, where I use the onset definitions of Miguel,
Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), respectively. The coefficients are
in size and significance similar to the base results above, which highlights the robustness of the
estimates.
Finally, Table A.IV shows the result with the full control variable specification—including the
subsequent age cohort size. Even though the quantitative and qualitative effect of male youth on
civil conflict does not change, the results must be interpreted with care. This is because some of
the additional control variables might induce a misspecification error.23
22Note that this does not represent elasticity though, as compared to the previous columns in Table IV.
23It has also to be noted, that population density and total population are equivalent in the country-fixed effects
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Table V: 2SLS Results - Youth Bulge and Interactions
Dependent Onset Civil Conflictt
Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log m15–19t 4.709*** 4.629** 4.004*** 1.883***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.002] [0.005]
Log raint 2.479*** Log agricul. 3.955* Log foreign 0.561* Urbanizationt 0.067∗
(0.876) outputt (2.186) aidt (0.303) (0.033)
Log m15–19 -0.507*** Log m15-19 -0.743* Log m15-19 -0.107* Log m15-19 -0.016∗
x log raint (0.171) x agriculturet (0.408) x log aidt (0.058) x urbanizationt (0.008)
Obs. 1754 1639 1666 1754
RMSE 0.259 0.249 0.272 0.230
F-test excl. IV 20.417 4.511 3.907 7.058
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. m15–19 is the abbreviation for men15–19. 2SLS estimates with log raint−17 as instrument
for men15-19 in the first stage. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends, time dummies
and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket [] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin
Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. Agricultural output is measured as the net production value index per capita
from the FAO. Urbanization is the share of the urban population in total. The F-test is the first-stage test statistic of the excluded instrument.
RMSE is the root mean square error.
Youth Bulge Interactions
In this subsection, I turn to the question of which socioeconomic and political conditions mitigate
or facilitate the impact of youth bulges on the onset of civil conflict. Since cohort sizes are more
or less fixed over time—except in the case of rare events like famine24—such an offsetting effect
must work through the cohort-specific marginalization rate (Eq. (2)).
In particular, the discussion in Section 2 suggests that insurgencies draw mostly on marginal-
ized males in the rural hinterland—which depends heavily on rainfed agriculture. Hence, it is to
be expected that young men facing better economic conditions are less likely to partake in violent
behavior and are more difficult to recruit into rebel armies. Thus, in years of good economic con-
ditions the influx of an exceptionally large cohort, (X(Tin)), might be offset by a decline in the
marginalization rate which leads to an overall smaller pool of PR, despite this youth bulge.
Using contemporaneous rainfall as a proxy for agricultural output allows me to derive estimates
which are free of endogeneity problems, since both, t − 17 and t, rainfall events are exogenous
to civil conflict and are orthogonal to each other. Table V, column 1, shows that both contem-
poraneous rainfall and its interaction term with male youth aged 15–19 enter highly significantly.
The youth bulge effect now increases to 4.7, and the size of the interaction term coefficient is -0.5
and negative. Thus, the data suggest that increasing income in rural agricultural areas hampers the
risk of civil conflict significantly. This suggests an opportunity cost effect in the context of youth
specification as long as country area does not change.
24However, such exceptional events such as heavy droughts resulting in famine usually affect all population classes
(Brückner, 2010)
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bulges. In years with better economic perspectives, male youth are less likely to join insurgen-
cies. This mitigating effect, however, is not limited to the youth population, since better economic
conditions most likely reduce the marginalization rate across all age groups within the pool of
PR—age 17–44. On the other hand, lifting SSA from rainfed agricultural dependence might help
to reduce the risk of negative economic shocks and hence reduce the impact of youth bulges.
Furthermore, despite the positive sign of the contemporaneous rainfall coefficient, the total
rainfall effect—evaluated at the mean—is negative, which implies a lower risk of civil conflict in
years with better agricultural conditions. For example, increasing contemporaneous rainfall by one
percent reduces the overall risk of conflict by about 0.8 percentage points. This corroborates the
findings of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) and implies that economic conditions (in the
context of civil conflict) and youth population size are co-dependent.
Column 2 shows the results for a more direct measure of agricultural production, by using a
per capita agricultural output (net) index from the FAO. The index and the interaction term enter
significantly at the ten-percent level and yield similar results as before.
Column 3 includes log foreign aid received by each country and its interaction term with the
male youth population. This latter coefficient is negative and significant at the ten-percent level.
This fits into the argument outlined just yet. Increasing foreign aid at least partly helps to lift
youth population out of the extreme poverty that is still found in rural areas—often dominated by
subsistence-oriented agriculture. Thus, as the population becomes less vulnerable economically,
recruitment costs increase and hence help to offset the risk of conflict associated with youth bulges.
I conclude that, generally, factors that reduce poverty and improve economic perspectives reduce
the risk of civil conflict.
In turn, evaluating the aid effect with regard to its own mean and the mean of men aged 15–19
yields a positive net impact. Thus, even though foreign aid hampers the youth bulge risk, its overall
effect increases the risk of civil conflict. This is in line with the findings of Nunn and Qian (2012)
who show that United-States food aid increases the risk of conflict, as looted food aid can boost
insurgencies. However, my findings indicate a more subtle relationship between foreign aid and
civil conflict, since aid also improves the economic perspectives of the youth population, which in
turn reduces the likelihood of conflict.
Next, I turn to urbanization. Here, both the share of urban population and its interaction term
with log men 15–19 enter significantly at the ten-percent level. The results show that the youth
bulge effect diminishes as the share of the urbanized population increases. Thus, high urbanization
might act as a protection against civil conflicts induced by youth bulges. This seems plausible,
since insurgencies in SSA are predominantly rural-based, owing to the lack of government control
in the hinterland (Herbst, 2000).25 Hence, higher urbanization leads to the geographical separation
25This is mirrored in the circumstance that insurgencies usually draw their followers from areas outside urban
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between potential recruits (urban) and insurgency hideaway (rural). Furthermore, more than 70
percent of the youths in SSA live in rural areas where the most severe poverty is located and where
the youth face poor economic prospects and deprivation (World Bank, 2009; Ravallion, Chen, and
Sangraula, 2007; Gordon et al., 2003; United Nations, 2005).26 Thus, urbanization makes it more
difficult for insurgency leaders to recruit, since urbanization counters extreme deprivation.
The significant interaction terms do imply another important finding: Onsets of civil conflict
are more likely when several adverse factors coincide; that is, exceptionally large youth cohorts
or low income years are per se not a good predictor of conflict. However, when such events
occur together—e.g., low incomes and a large youth population—the likelihood of civil conflict
increases.
Finally, the data does not support the idea that better democratic conditions or more openness
to trade hamper the youth bulge effect (regressions not shown). I also do not find significant
interaction effects between youth bulges and GDP per capita, which can be attributed to the fact
that the latter does not explicitly capture agricultural income (regressions not shown).
Youth Bulge and Youth Dent
Following the argument in Section 2, positive shocks in the male youth-population size leads to
an excess supply of labor and marginalization. In this subsection, I shortly discuss whether only
positive shocks in the size of the male youth population (youth bulge) drive the risk of conflict or
whether negative shocks in the size of the male youth population (youth dents) might also reduce
the risk of conflict. Table A.V in the Appendix presents the results where the sample is splitted
according to the country-respective mean values of the male youth population. Since the sample-
split leads to a weaker first-stage results—owing to variation loss—I drop in some specifications
the country-specific time trends, as this allows me to derive more precise first-stage estimates.
The results in Table A.V show that youth dents do not contribute towards explaning the pattern
of civil conflict—in particular, they do not reduce the risk of conflict occurring. In turn, the results
above are driven by youth bulges which increase the risk of civil conflict. That is in line with
the theoretical considerations that indicate that exceptionally large youth cohorts—which cannot
be absorbed by the prevailing economic system—lead to excess labor and marginalization. This,
in turn, results in a higher risk of conflict. Factors that increase economic perspectives—such
as higher agricultural income—reduce marginalization which hampers the risk of civil conflict
attributable to youth bulges. The finding further suggests that the marginalization effect—through
the bottleneck effect on the labor market—dominates the population-size effect in the context of
youth bulges.
developments (Sommers, 2003).
26Among others, malnutrition is more acute in rural areas (Uthman and Aremu, 2008; Gordon et al., 2003).
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Table VI: Onset Civil Conflict and Rainfall Lags - Moderation
Rainfall lags: t-40 t-41 t-42 t-43 t-44 t-45 t-46 t-47 t-48 t-49 t-50
Onset -0.010 0.029 0.012 -0.047* -0.048* 0.032 -0.005 -0.049 0.028 -0.017 -0.009
conflictt (0.032) (0.035) (0.012) (0.027) (0.024) (0.039) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034) (0.038)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Table shows the regression results of the onset of civil conflict on the rainfall
lags t− 40 to t− 50. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends, time dummies and
robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses. 1,754 Observations.
5.4 Mid-Life Moderation and Conflict
The theoretical argument above relates large cohorts in their mid-40s—which transit out of the
pool of PR—to a decline in the risk of civil conflict. In particular, when an exceptionally large
cohort exits the pool of PR, the size of this pool shrinks, which in turn reduces the risk of conflict.
Assuming that birth year rainfall drives cohort size, it is to be expected that lagged rainfall variation
in a window of t− 40 to t− 50 negatively affects conflict. Table VI shows the estimates of lagged
rainfall t−40 to t−50 on the risk of civil conflict. In fact, the rainfall lags t−43 and t−44 display
negative regression coefficients that border the five-percent significance-level with a joined F-test
statistic of 4.8.
Table A.VI, columns 1-2, show that these two lagged rainfall levels are uncorrelated with males
aged 15–19, but significantly positively correlated with the population size of males aged 40–44.
This result is robust to the inclusion of various rainfall levels in column 3. Consequently, by using
the lagged rainfall levels as instruments, the estimates of the 2SLS setup yield a significant and
negative effect of the cohort size of males aged 40–44 on the risk of civil conflict (column 5)
with a first-stage F-test statistic of 5.31. The point estimates imply a decline in the likelihood of
conflict by 0.8 percentage points when the population aged 40–44 increases by one percent. This
moderation effect that occurs when large cohorts exiting the pool of PR is smaller than its reversed
youth bulge effect—where large cohorts enter the PR pool. The reason might be a decline in the
cohort-specific marginalization rate over time—e.g., better employment conditions through human
capital accumulation.
Column 6 shows the results when I include both, males aged 15–19 and 40–44. Importantly,
the birth year rainfall variation for both cohorts identifies their respective cohorts. The results are
comparable to column 5 and Table IV, column 1. Comparing the coefficients shows that the youth
bulge effects dominates the moderation effect.
6 Youth Bulges and Low-Level Social Violence
In this short section, I present evidence that youth bulges also induce low-level social conflict. This
section, then, serves two purposes: Youth bulges trigger different levels of violence and conflict in
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SSA; the relationship between the birth-year rainfall levels of males aged 15–19 and the onset of
conflict is not limited to the PRIO database.
Because of the loss in variation, owing to the severe reduction along the time dimension—a loss
of 30 years—I am not able to control for country-specific time trends in this setup.27 Table A.VII in
the Appendix shows the results.28 Column 1 depicts—at least at the ten-percent level—significant
coefficients of the t − 14 and t − 17 lag rainfall levels. However, I cannot reject the hypothesis
that the rainfall coefficients t − 14 to t − 17 contribute in an equivalent way to the explanation
of low-level social violence (p-value 0.92). Here then, the critical age is confined to 14–17 years.
This indicates that the respective youth cohorts, X(Tin), who influence the onset of low-level civil
violence—such as demonstrations and riots—exhibit a somewhat younger age structure. Hence,
exceptionally large youth cohorts contribute to the onset of social violence at an earlier age than in
the case of full-fledged civil conflicts.
Using the birth year rainfall level t − 17 as instrument allows me to evaluate the youth bulge
effect on the onset of low-level social violence in column 3. The result is qualitatively similar to the
case of civil conflict, but larger. Increasing the male youth population aged 15–19 by one percent
increases the risk of social conflict by about 4 percentage points. This implies that youth bulges
translate more quickly into low-level violence than into civil conflicts. Hence, the data suggests that
the threshold for joining riots might be lower than the threshold for joining insurgencies. Another
interpretation might be that the organization of civil conflicts is not always feasible even though a
sufficiently large pool of PR exists. That again would highlight the fact that several driving factors
have to emerge simultaneously in order to ignite such a rare event as a civil conflict.
In turn, the younger age structure cannot be attributed to the sample restriction towards a later
time period, since column 4 still associates the onset of civil conflict with the rainfall levels t− 17
and t− 19.
7 Contemporaneous Rainfall and Infant Mortality
The proposition that contemporaneous rainfall affects the birth cohort size is a central proposition
of this paper. Existing literature relates rural income fluctuations in the birth year to infant mortality
(Devereux, 2009; Baird, Friedman, and Schady, 2011; Rice et al., 2000).
Table VII confirms these findings by linking agricultural output to infant mortality and the
number of surviving infants. I employ contemporaneous rainfall as an instrument for the agricul-
tural output. The F-statistic of the excluded instrument indicates that the identification assumption
27This does not appear to be a structural problem, since the reduced form effect persists.
28I do not present the results of the alternative rainfall levels, in order to save space. The PREC/L and Delaware
rainfall data estimates yield quantitatively and qualitatively the same results. (Tables are available on request from the
author.)
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Table VII: 2SLS Results - Rainfall, Birth Rate and Infant Mortality until 1995
Dependent Variable: Infant Log Infant Log Men0–1
Mortality Rate Survivals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log agricultural -0.014** 0.324** 0.299*** Log raint 0.027**
outputt [0.042] [0.011] [0.005] (0.010)
Obs. 1063 1063 1063 1063
RMSE 0.005 0.052 0.065 0.061
F-test excl. IV 4.850 4.850 4.850
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 2SLS estimates with log raint as instrument for agricultural output in the first stage. In
all columns, raint + 2 to raint − 2 are included which enter nonsignificant at the ten-percent level. FE estimator regressions in all columns
with country dummies, country-specific time trends, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses (). The
square bracket[] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. The F-test is the first
stage test statistic of the excluded instrument. RMSE is the root mean square error. Infant mortality rate is the number of infant deaths per
1,000 live births. Mortality to live birth rate is the share of absolute infant mortalities to absolute live births. Infant survival rate is the difference
between the absolute number of live births and infant mortality. Agricultural output is measured as the net production value index per capita
from the FAO.
is satisfied. In particular, in the relevant period until 1995, rainfall is positively and significantly
related to agricultural output.29
Column 1 reports a coefficient of -0.014, which implies a decrease in the infant mortality rate
(mortalities per 1,000 live births) by 1.4 percentage points, if agricultural output per capita in-
creases by one percent. In turn, column 2 depicts the elasticity between agricultural output and the
number of surviving infants—live births minus mortalities in a given year. Here the results imply
a 0.3 percent increase in the number of surviving infants for each percent increase in agricultural
output.
In addition, columns 3 and 4 show the point estimates when the log of males aged 0 to 1 years
is the dependent variable. Consistent with the argument that rainfall induces fluctuations in co-
hort sizes through agricultural income, the results indicate a positive and significant relationship
between contemporaneous rainfall, agricultural output and the respective age cohort. Hence, Ta-
ble VII supports the argument that rainfall affects the birth cohort sizes by governing the infant
mortality rate through agricultural income.
8 Consistency Tests
In this section, I discuss different rainfall datasets and present additional evidence on the validity
of my instrumental variable strategy in the context of youth bulges and civil conflict.
291995 is the last relevant birth cohort in my sample, since I look at male youth aged 15–19.
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Full Set of Birth Year Rainfall Events and Alternative Rainfall Data
I now turn to the different instrument specifications in Table A.VIII, to ensure that the results do
not depend on a particular rainfall lag or rainfall dataset. In all columns, I control for t + 1, t, and
t − 1 rainfall levels, which enter nonsignificantly (coefficients not reported). In columns 3, 4, 6,
and 8, I do report clustered standard errors at the country level, instead of the usual country and
year level.30 First, I concentrate on the rainfall levels from t−17 to t−19 which all contribute in a
similar way to the explanation of civil conflict according to Section 5.2. That is, the data places the
relevant age of transition into the pool of PR, X(Tin), within the age group 17–19. Columns 1 and
2 report the results for the average t−17 to t−19 rainfall lag and the individual lags as instruments,
respectively. The second-stage estimates yield quantitatively and qualitatively equivalent results
as before with a first-stage F-test statistic bordering the five-percent level (column 1) or better
(column 2).31 Furthermore, the Hansen-test statistic indicates that the instruments are valid.
To show that the result does not depend on the inclusion of the t− 17 lag, column 3 depicts the
result with the t− 18 and t− 19 rainfall lags as instruments. Here, the first-stage F-test statistic is
somewhat weak. Importantly, however, the second-stage yields coefficient sizes and significance
values which are close to the base results in Table IV. Thus, all rainfall lags—that affect civil
conflict and male population (17 to 19)—consistently suggest similar sized youth bulge effects.
There is another point to stress here. By using these rainfall lags, I identify only the part (the
population aged 17–19) of the quinquennial cohort (15 to 19) that contributes significantly to the
onset of conflict—the population cohorts that transit into the pool of PR. Thus, using the full set
of birth year rainfall levels in column 4 yields strong first-stage estimates, but the coefficient of
the youth bulge becomes smaller. This is because my instruments now also identify the younger
cohorts—included in the quinquennial cohort—and which are not related to civil conflict: the age
group 15–16. Consequently, by using the additional birth year rainfall events as instruments leads
to a drop of the Hansen-test statistic. Nevertheless, the coefficients cannot be distinguished in a
statistical sense.
Using the average rainfall from t− 17 to t− 19, or the t− 17 rainfall event from the Delaware
rainfall data, or the PREC/L dataset in columns 5-8, yields again basically identical youth bulge
effects and similar first-stage results.32 However, using the PREC/L datasets implies a loss of seven
years of observations.
Given these results, I conclude that the findings do not rely on a particular dataset or on a
particular rainfall level.
30This is because the number of instruments relative to cluster sizes does not allow me to calculate the robust
covariance. As a result, the first-stage F-test yields implausibly high values.
31Note that for some setups the test statistic is based on (5,40) degrees of freedom.
32The first-stage F-test statistics are all below the five-percent levels.
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Table VIII: Instrument Test
Dependent Variable: Log Raint−13
OLS IV
(1) (2)a
Log men15–19t 0.184** -0.442
(0.077) [0.590]
Obs. 1754 1754
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-
specific time-trends and time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses (). The square
bracket[] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments.
a In column 2, the instrument is the t− 17 rainfall level.
Instrumental Variable Discussion
Section 5.2 highlights a significant relationship between lagged t − 17 rainfall and the size of the
male cohort aged 15–19, and the preceding subsection shows a significant relationship between
contemporaneous rainfall and infant mortality. The findings confirm that birth year rainfall is a
plausible instrument for cohort size. For further tests of the validity of the instrument, I consider
additional properties of the instrumental variable. Table A.II shows the bivariate correlation be-
tween the lag t−17 rainfall and the control variables included in my study. The respective p-values
are all insignificant, which gives some indication that the instrument is orthogonal—for these given
confounders—to the error term of the regression equation. Further evidence is given by the fact
that a direct significant link exists between lag t− 17 rainfall and the onset of civil conflict, which
also indicates orthogonality.
Next, I perform a falsification test following von Hinke Kessler Scholder et al. (2013). The test
requires that the 2SLS estimates are capable of separating causal effects from naive correlation.
Since birth year t − 13 rainfall is a significant driver of the cohort size aged 10 to 14, and due to
the between cohort correlation, the OLS estimates in Table VIII, column 1, show a positive and
significant relationship between the lag t−13 rainfall and the youth cohort size aged 15–19.33 This
effect, however, is not causal, but stems from the omitted confounder (cohort aged 10 to 14). In
turn, the 2SLS result shows a severe decline in the size of the coefficient and a fairly nonsignificant
relationship. These findings indicate that the instrument performs well.
33In fact, each cohort up until age 15 to 19 can be associated with a specific and significant birth year rainfall level.
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9 Conclusion
Youth bulges (exceptional surges in the male youth population) are identified as a major correlate
of civil conflicts, both in theoretical and empirical work across the sciences. Evidence of a causal
relationship is still missing, due to omitted variable bias and endogeneity. To address these issues,
I employ rainfall variation in the birth years of the respective age cohorts as an instrument for their
size.
In the case of SSA, my estimates reveal that the effect of the male youth population aged 15–
19 on the risk of civil conflict occuring has a substantial effect. Increasing this population group
by one percent induces an increase in the risk of 1.4 percentage points. The size of the youth
bulge effect depends on the prevailing economic conditions. Better economic perspectives in rural
SSA—in particular, high contemporaneous rainfall levels and, as consequence, higher agricultural
income—hamper the risk of civil conflict attributable to youth bulges. These findings, then, suggest
that the emergence of civil conflict is more likely in years when several adverse factors coincide;
e.g., a large youth population combined with low agricultural output. The data, further, suggest that
the rate of urbanization mitigates the effect of youth bulges on the onset of civil conflict. In order
to replicate my results, I show that youth bulges also increase the risk of low-level social violence
in SSA. The estimates here show an even stronger effect. Increasing male youth population aged
15–19 by one percent increases the risk of the onset of low-level social conflict by 4 percentage
points.
I present evidence that exceptionally large male cohorts in their mid-40s trigger a decline in
the risk of conflict. Increasing this population group by one percent results in a decline in the risk
of conflict by 0.8 percentage points.
I argue that infant mortality rates governed the cohort sizes in SSA during the sample period.
In turn, exogenous shocks (rainfall) induce fluctuations in infant mortality rates—and hence cohort
sizes—through available rural household income in these rain-fed farming systems. Youth bulges
lead to changes in the likelihood of civil conflict by increasing the pool of potential recruits. That
is, when cohorts reach the critical age where they can be drafted into rebel armies, large youth
cohorts shift the size of the equilibrium pool of potential recruits upwards. This takes place along
an extensive (cohort size) and intensive (marginalization) margin. The latter is attributed to a
bottleneck effect on the labor market. Similarly, when large cohorts exit the pool of PR when age
40–45, the likelihood of conflict declines again.
I back the plausibility of my instrument by identifying contemporaneous rainfall as a driving
factor of agricultural output and infant mortality in SSA. Instrumenting agricultural output with
contemporaneous rainfall shows that agricultural output is closely related to infant mortality in this
region.
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Appendices
A Tables and Figures
Table A.I: Robustness - Dynamics and Different Onset Specifications
Dependent Onset Onset(B)c Onset(C)d
Variable: Civil Conflictt Civil Conflictt Civil Conflictt
OLS sysGMM 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)a (4)b (5) (6) (7) (8)
Onset Civil -0.186*** -0.124**
Conflictt−1 (0.037) (0.051)
Log raint−17 0.054** 0.046** 0.052** 0.051***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019)
Log men15–19t 1.613** 5.471*** 1.467*** 1.389***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005]
Obs. 1669 1669 1721 1754 1678 1678 2050 2050
RMSE 0.201 0.228 0.229 0.206 0.216 0.198 0.210
F-test excl. IV 5.022 2.036 5.960 5.291
Note: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. sysGMM refers to system GMM estimates. FE estimator regressions in all columns with state dummies,
time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket[] gives the p-value of the
Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. RMSE is the root mean square error. The F-test is the first-stage
test statistic of the excluded instrument.
aIn column 3, I dropped the upper and lower percentile of the t− 17 rainfall data, as described in Section 5.1.
dIn column 4, I partial out the log female15-19 population.
cOnset(B) is coded following Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), where the onset of peace is coded as missing.
dOnset (C) is coded following Fearon and Laitin (2003), where all non-conflict onset observations are coded as 0.
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Table A.II: Correlation Coefficients - Instrument and Covariates
Dependent Log GDP p. Urbanization Democracy Log Log Log rain Log Capital
Variable (t): Capita (Polity IV) Rain Foreign Aid {t−2,..,t−11} Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log raint−15 0.044 -0.238 -0.486 0.040 -0.019 -0.030 0.012
(0.042) (0.417) (0.345) (0.048) (0.124) (0.018) (0.020)
Log raint−16 0.037 -0.041 0.062 -0.033 0.133 -0.039 0.014
(0.048) (0.420) (0.260) (0.041) (0.145) (0.016) (0.020)
Log raint−17 0.048 0.210 0.229 -0.012 0.102 -0.038 0.017
(0.043) (0.437) (0.272) (0.026) (0.117) (0.016) (0.017)
Log raint−18 0.033 0.449 -0.261 -0.067 0.255 -0.036 0.011
(0.036) (0.353) (0.540) (0.049) (0.176) (0.019) (0.019)
Log raint−19 -0.009 0.451 0.089 0.063 0.515 -0.049 -0.008
(0.034) (0.365) (0.345) (0.038) (0.264) (0.023) (0.022)
Obs. 1677 1754 1546 1754 1666 1754 1071
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends and time dummies
and robust standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses (). Urbanization is the share of urban population in total. Foreign
Aid is the total aid received in current US dollars. Capital stock is the real capital stock of the agricultural sector. rain{t−2,..,t−11} is the
average rainfall over a ten-year period from t− 2 to t− 11.
Table A.III: Additional Results-Identification Strategy
Dependent Log men Log pop. Log pop. Log pop. Log pop.
Variable: 15–19t 20–24t 10–14t 25–29t 40–44t
OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)a (3)a (4) (5)a (6) (7)a
Log 0.028
rain{t−2,..,t−11} (0.097)
Log raint−15 0.001 0.002
(0.019) (0.015)
Log raint−16 -0.002 -0.001
(0.018) (0.013)
Log raint−17 0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Log raint−18 0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010
(0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Log raint−19 0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Log men15-19t 0.253 0.946 0.258 0.247 0.554*** 0.572
[0.720] [0.174] (0.182) [0.898] (0.153) [0.616]
Obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
RMSE 0.065 0.060 0.054 0.089 0.089 0.104 0.104
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time
trends, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket[] gives the
p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. RMSE is the root mean square error.
rain{t−2,..,t−11} is the average rainfall over a ten-year period from t− 2 to t− 11.
a2SLS estimates with lagged rainfall levels t− 15 and t− 16 as first-stage instrument.
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Table A.IV: 2SLS Results: Full Control Variables Specification
Explanatory Log Log Log Log pop. Log GDP p. ∆Polity Log real Log remaining Log
Variables: men15–19t raint raint+1 densityt capitat IVt opennesst populationt pop20–24
Onset 3.815*** 0.057 0.030 -1.841 -0.208 -0.010* 0.082 0.233 -1.082*
conflictt [0.001] (0.041) (0.023) (1.755) (0.203) (0.006) (0.070) (0.377) (0.638)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 2SLS regression with log raint−17 as instrument for log men15–19 in the first stage.
Observations: 1,520. F-test of excluded instrument: 3.2. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time
trends (except column 6), time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses (). The square bracket[] gives the
p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. The F-test is the first-stage test statistic of the
excluded instrument. ∆ Polity IV is the change of the Polity2 score from the Polity IV database. Real openness is from the PWT.
Table A.V: 2SLS Results - Sample Split Youth Bulge
Dependent Variable: Onset Civil Conflictt
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample A: Above country-specific mean
Log raint−17 0.123*** 0.128***
(0.045) (0.035)
Log men15–19t 8.526*** 3.635*** 4.849***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
Log raint 2.078**
(0.935)
Log men15–19 x -0.399**
log raint (0.167)
Obs. 764 764 764 764 764
F-test excl. IV 1.509 4.626 12.430
Sample B: Below country-specific mean
Log raint−17 0.004 0.002
(0.015) (0.014)
Log men15-19t 0.448 0.046 -0.025
[0.787] [0.889] [0.981]
Log raint -0.038
(0.602)
Log men15-19 x 0.006
log raint (0.138)
Obs. 990 990 990 990 990
F-test excl. IV 1.761 4.029 3.713
Country-specific YES NO YES NO NO
time trends
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sample A includes all observations with the men15–19 population above the country
specific mean. Sample B vice versa. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, time dummies and robust standard
errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket [] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared
test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. The F-test is the first-stage test statistic of the excluded instrument. RMSE is the
root mean square error.
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Table A.VI: 2SLS Results - Mid-Life Moderation and Civil Conflict
Dependent Variable: Log Log Onset Civil Conflictt
men15–19t men40–44t
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)a (4) (5) (6)
Log raint−43 0.005 0.065** 0.066** -0.048*
(0.012) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026)
Log raint−44 0.004 0.063* 0.063* -0.054*
(0.014) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028)
Log -0.790*** -0.887***
men40–44t [0.000] [0.000]
Log 1.484***
men15–19t [0.000]
First stage regression Log men40–44t
Log raint−43 0.065** 0.069**
(0.030) (0.030)
Log raint−44 0.063* 0.064*
(0.032) (0.032)
Log raint−17 0.024
(0.019)
Log raint−18 0.013
(0.021)
First stage regression Log men15–19t
Log raint−43 0.010
(0.013)
Log raint−44 0.006
(0.014)
Log raint−17 0.041**
(0.016)
Log raint−18 0.028*
(0.015)
Obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754
RMSE 0.065 0.109 0.109 0.206 0.221 0.230
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time trends,
time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in parentheses (). The square bracket [] gives the p-value of the
Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. RMSE is the root mean square error.
aRegression model includes lagged rainfall levels t + 1 to t− 1 as controls (coefficients not reported).
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Table A.VII: Youth Bulge and Low-Level Social Violence
Dependent Variable: Onset Low-Level Onset
Social Violencet Civil Conflictt
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
(1)a (2) (3)a (4)
Log men15–19t 4.025***
[0.004]
Log raint−14 0.154* 0.038
(0.082) (0.049)
Log raint−15 0.110 -0.077
(0.072) (0.046)
Log raint−16 0.106 0.047
(0.087) (0.039)
Log raint−17 0.166** 0.185** 0.152***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.042)
Log raint−18 0.056 -0.071
(0.066) (0.046)
Log raint−19 0.053 0.106*
(0.067) (0.062)
Obs. 820 820 820 662
RMSE 0.400 0.401 0.483 0.244
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In all columns I control for t and t + 1 rainfall levels (nonsignificant). FE estimator
regressions in all columns with country dummies, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level in
parentheses (). The square bracket [] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak
instruments. RMSE is the root mean square error. Low-level social violence is from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)
and excludes all explicit urban events.
a 2SLS regression with log raint−17 as instrument for log men15–19 in the first stage (F-test excluded instrument 3.5).
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Table A.VIII: 2SLS Robustness- Youth Bulge and Civil Conflict
Dependent Variable: Onset Civil Conflictt
GPCC Rain Data Delaware Rain Data PREC/L Rain Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Men15-19t 1.651*** 1.369** 1.388** 0.739** 1.724** 1.716** 1.267* 1.365**
[0.003] [0.048] [0.011] [0.039] [0.013] [0.024] [0.078] [0.013]
First stage: Log men15-19
Log 0.083*
rain{t−17,..,t−19} (0.042)
Log raint−15 0.030**
(0.014)
Log raint−16 0.029**
(0.012)
Log raint−17 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.035* 0.035** 0.036* 0.039**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018)
Log raint−18 0.027* 0.027** 0.026** 0.019 0.022
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
Log raint−19 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.008 0.017
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Obs. 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1754 1553 1476
RMSE 0.230 0.222 0.223 0.210 0.232 0.232 0.223 0.223
F-test 4.027 2.007 3.373 3.026 3.721 3.450 3.535 4.295
Hansen p-value 0.129 0.253 0.107 0.362 0.274
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE estimator regressions in all columns with country dummies, country-specific time-trends,
time dummies and robust standard errors clustered at country and year level—except in column 3, 4, 6, 8: country level—in parentheses ().
The square bracket [] gives the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin Chi-squared test statistic which is robust to weak instruments. All regressions
include log rainfall t + 1, t, t − 1 which are not reported and enter insignificant. The F-test is the first stage test statistic of the excluded
instrument. RMSE is the root mean square error. The rainfall datasets are described in the main text. rain{t−17,..,t−19} is the average rainfall
for the lags t− 17 to t− 19.
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Figure A.I: SSA full sample of log men15–19 and onset of civil conflict. Hollow circles represent civil conflict onset
events. Filled dots are no civil conflict events. Bar charts represent fraction of observations of log men 15–19 below
and above the sample mean (at 0) given that civil conflict onset (onset=1) is observed. Residuals are purged by time
trend, country-specific time trends, country fixed effects and time fixed effects.
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